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Control Preference and Financial 
Attributes: Founders as CEOs in 
Small, Publicly Traded Firms
William R. Lane 
Mel Jameson
Existing theories of the firm are silent with respect to cross-sectional differences 
in performance or characteristics of firms attributable to different types of 
managers. We hypothesize that the investment, financing and dividend deci­
sions of founders differ systematically from those of nonfounder managers as a 
result of 1) founders valuing control more highly than do nonfounders, a con­
dition we refer to as the control retention effect, and 2) founders being associ­
ated with younger, faster growing firms, a condition we label the life cycle effect. 
Our findings are that both effects are at work, but in different decision areas. 
No evidence is found that founders exploit their status to extract higher direct 
compensation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial analysis of the firm has traditionally been based on the neoclassi­
cal economic model of shareholder wealth maximization. More recently, 
agency theoretic models have recognized conflicts of interest, and the 
resulting interaction, between shareholders and managers. In neither 
model, however, is there room for differences in managerial behavior except 
in response to differing economic stimuli. Consequently, little attention has 
been given to cross-sectional differences in performance or characteristics 
of firms attributable to different types of managers. In this paper we inves­
tigate the proposition that one class of managers, founders, makes financial 
decisions that differ systematically from those of other managers. Specifi­
cally, we investigate the influence that founder status of the chief executive
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officer has on the firm's investing, financing, and dividend pohcy decisions. 
As a corollary, we also investigate whether founder status affects the CEO's 
direct compensation.
There is little empirical evidence of cross-sectional differences in 
firms being associated with managerial attributes. The extensive literature 
on takeovers as a disciplinary part of the managerial labor market, while 
implying that some managers are “better” than others with respect to 
shareholder wealth maximization, does not suggest a taxonomy of manag­
ers. Demsetz and Lehn [3] speculate that some managers seek to head 
media and sports firms because of the “amenity potential” of those indus­
tries, but they do not interpret their results as evidence that such industry 
preferences systematically alter the performance of those managers' firms. 
Holderness and Sheehan [9] find firms with a majority blockholder exhibit 
larger advertising expenditures than other firms, but are not different with 
respect to research and development expenses, capital expenditures or 
Tobin's q ratio. They also find no evidence that majority blockholders 
expropriate wealth. Holderness and Sheehan [9, p. 323, n. II]  suggest 
without elaboration that majority shareholders who are founders might 
have a different effect on firm performance than nonfounders holding 
majority blocks.
We hypothesize that founders systematically value control more highly 
than do nonfounders, and that this preference influences their decisions. 
We refer to this inclination as the control retention effect. One factor that 
could confound the control retention effect is that founders are also more 
likely to head younger, faster growing firms, a condition that is also likely to 
affect their choices. We label this influence as the life cycle effect. In our 
empirical work, we compare a sample of founder managed and nonfounder 
managed firms. We assume that the endogenous policy decisions of the 
firm are revealed in the firm's financial characteristics, and that those deci­
sions reflect both the manager's individual preferences (i.e., the control 
retention effect) and the firm's exogenous investment opportunities (i.e., 
the life cycle effect).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we develop the two 
hypotheses in more detail, and examine the support for each in the litera­
ture. Section II focuses the analysis on areas in which decision making 
would be expected to differ under each of the hypotheses. From this basis, 
we define the specific variables we use to measure the various decisions and 
predict the effect of founder status on them under both hypotheses. In Sec­
tion III we describe the sample and methodology. We report our empirical 
results in Section ly  and our conclusions in Section V
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II. FOUNDER STATUS AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS
A. The Control Retention Hypothesis
One possible difference between founders and other managers is in 
the degree of attachment to “their” enterprises. Several studies have shown 
that control is valued in the market. Meeker and Joy [17], Lease, McCon­
nell, and Mikkelson [15], Jarrell and Poulsen [11], and Partch [23] find evi­
dence of this in the pricing of dual voting rights classes of stock. Similar 
evidence of the market value of control is reported by Walkling and Long
[29] (among many others) in studies of the behavior of equity prices around 
acquisitions, and by Dodd and Warner [4] and Pound [25] in their studies 
of proxy fights. Holderness and Sheehan [9], while finding no evidence 
that majority shareholders expropriate wealth, cite the managerial involve­
ment of majority shareholders as evidence of benefits to owning large 
blocks. Stulz [28] argues that the benefits of control of voting rights affects 
both the firm's capital structure and the proportion of the firm's equity held 
by insiders.
While some of the value placed on control undoubtedly stems from a 
desire to make value enhancing changes in operations, at least some of it 
seems to derive from a preference for control for its own sake. For,owners 
of small businesses, there is direct evidence on this point. Galante [7] 
reports the results of a survey of owners of small businesses and finds “con­
trol” identified second only to “pride in product/service” as a source of sat­
isfaction.
Beyond these indications that control matters in general, some litera­
ture suggests that founders, on average, hold even more tightly to control 
of “their” enterprise than do nonfounder managers. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny [18, p. 106] write that founders “... might play a special role in the 
company ... because their attachment to the company is more than just 
financial.” Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [19] cite founder status as a source 
of entrenchment, and report (among other findings) that founder status 
among the top officers adversely affects a measure of the firm's perfor­
mance. Elsewhere, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [18, 20] present evidence 
that founders are less susceptible to removal by boards of directors or by 
hostile takeover than are other managers. That is, founders have found it 
possible or desirable to entrench themselves more firmly than nonfounding 
managers. Evidence consistent with founders using this stronger entrench­
ment in ways detrimental to the value of the firm is presented by Johnson 
et al. [13]. They report a significant positive response to the death of a 
senior corporate executive who is a founder, and a negative response for the
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death of nonfounders. ^  Taken together with the evidence on entrench­
ment, this raises the possibility that founders' tighter control of their firms 
leads to different decision making behavior
We refer to this explanation for differences between founders and 
other managers as the “control retention” hypothesis. Compared to other 
managers, founders bias any decision involving a tradeoff between mana­
gerial control and value maximization toward control retention.
/
B. The Life Cycle Hypothesis
Founder managed firms are likely to be younger firms than non­
founder managed firms. The problems faced in the early phases of a firm's 
existence, and the managerial talents required to overcome them, differ 
from those faced in maturity. Holmes and Schmitz [10] present an eco­
nomic model of optimal allocation of managerial resources, whereby those 
with a comparative advantage in entrepreneurship repeatedly found corpo­
rations and then turn operations over to those with more traditional man­
agerial talents. In such a model, both the economic constraints faced by 
founder managed firms and the personality characteristics of their manag­
ers differ from those of nonfounder managed firms.
This idea is embodied in the notion of a “life-cycle” of a firm. The 
usual version of this product/firm life cycle identifies four phases: pioneer­
ing (or start-up), expansion (or growth), maturity, and decline. Cooper and 
Dunkelberg [2], consistent with Holmes and Schmitz [10], note that the dif­
ferent phases of the traditional life cycle require different managerial skills. 
We take the essential points of this exposition to be that newer firms 1) have 
a relatively richer set of growth opportunities, and 2) face relatively greater 
informational asymmetries in obtaining financing. The first of these obser­
vations can be interpreted to mean that firms in the early phases of the life 
cycle have a lower ratio of assets in place to growth options. Consistent with 
this picture, Evans [6] presents empirical evidence that firm growth 
decreases with age, holding size constant. Following the traditional termi­
nology, we refer to this explanation for differences between founder man­
aged and other firms as the “life cycle” hypothesis.
The two explanations we consider are not mutually exclusive and are 
not intended as competing hypotheses. Rather, they serve to motivate and 
organize our examination of founder managed firms. Both explanations 
indicate that factors not considered in static models of value maximizing 
firms or of manager-owner agency conflicts play a role in financial decision 
making. In particular, the control retention hypothesis postulates that dif­
ferent managers in identical economic circumstances behave differently
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because of different attitudes toward the importance of control, and that 
these differences are correlated with founder status.
Control Preference and Financial Attributes 47
III. GENERAL EFFECTS UNDER THE TWO HYPOTHESES
In this section we examine the general impact of the control retention effect 
and the life cycle eflfect on financing, investment, and dividend decisions in 
order to identify those areas in which decision making would be expected 
to differ under each of the hypotheses.
A. Control Retention
We propose that the greater is the manager's preference for control, 
the more the managers shy away from choices that tend to dilute their con­
trol. Because managers are acting in their own self interests, however, the 
investment, financing, and dividend decisions are interrelated.
1. Financing decisions. Control preference leads managers to favor 
those forms of financing involving the least possible surrender of control to 
new security holders. Thus, internal financing is preferable to debt, which 
is preferable to equity financing. While this ordering follows Myers [21] 
“pecking order” theory of capital structure, the point is not to establish an 
absolute priority, but to predict differences in capital structure. Thus we 
predict managers with a greater degree of control preference use more 
internal financing, more debt and less equity than do other managers in 
identical situations. Consistent with this hypothesis, Amihud, Lev and Trav- 
los [1] argue that the choice of financing method in acquisitions is moti­
vated by the insiders* desire to retain control. Bidders with large insider 
holdings tend not to issue stock, but are more likely to issue cash.
The liquidity of the firm is affected by both the investment and financ­
ing decisions. Investment in liquid assets reduces the firm's risk of default, 
but also reduces the value of the equity and increases the likelihood of a 
takeover. Papaioannou, Strock, and Travlos [22] examine the situations 
under which the firm would likely carry excess liquidity (cash and securities 
as a proportion of total assets).^ Because Uquidity reduces risk, reduces 
future needs for external capital, and permits greater use of debt financing, 
we predict managers with a greater degree of control preference hold 
higher levels of liquidity than other managers.
2. Investment decisions. Managers with a strong preference for control 
will be less inclined to undertake investment projects to the extent that the
projects will require outside financing. Positive net present value projects 
are rejected when the value to the manager of the loss of control resulting 
from outside financing exceeds the value of their share of the project. Thus 
we expect control preference to be inversely related to capital expenditures.
Control retention also affects the investment in intangible assets, such 
as research and development and advertising expenditures. As with tangi­
ble investment, a reduction in these outlays decreases the need for external 
financing (i.e., increases internally available funds). Zeckhouser and Pound
[30] and Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn [12] recognize another control retaining 
aspect of intangible investment. They argue intangible investment 
increases the cost (and thus decreases the amount) of external monitoring 
of the firm's management, which in turn decreases the supply of debt to the 
firm. As debt financing implies less loss of control than does external 
equity, and therefore is more desirable, we expect control preference to lead 
to lower than average levels of intangible investment.
In addition to predicting lower levels of investment, the control reten­
tion hypothesis predicts lower project risk. Managers are generally pre­
sumed to be more risk averse than wealth maximizing shareholders because 
a large portion of their wealth is firm-specific human capital. A preference 
for retaining control provides the manager with a further incentive to 
reduce firm-specific risk: the loss of the firm is the loss of a controlling posi­
tion. Again, although there are countervailing arguments, we are interested 
in the comparative prediction that control preferring managers choose 
lower risk projects than does the general population of managers.^
3. Dividend decisions. The dividend decision is linked to both the 
investment decision and the financing decision. Smaller dividends mean 
more internal funds available for investment and less need for external 
financing.
According to Easterbrook [5], by paying fewer dividends, and by min­
imizing external financing, however, these firms would be less monitored 
than other firms, and have lower valuation (higher “agency” costs). Thus, 
in dividend policy, the manager desiring to retain control trades off the risk 
of loss of control through external financing against the risk of a disciplinary 
takeover. The greater is the manager's entrenchment and insulation firom 
takeover, the lower dividend payment can be. Under the control retention 
hypothesis, dividend payout is inversely related to control preference.^
B. Life Cycle
This study assumes that, if the control retention hypothesis is valid, its 
effects should be observed among founder-managers. Since founders are.
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by definition, the first managers of their firms, founder managed firms 
tend to be drawn from earher phases of the Ufa cycle. Thus we need to con­
sider how this affects the predictions of the previous section. Characteriz­
ing firms in these early phases as having rich growth opportunities, but 
facing significant asymmetric information problems in financing, we dis­
cuss in this section the effect of the life cycle on observed financing, invest­
ment, and dividend decisions.
1. Financing decisions. Several authors have argued that the use of debt 
is negatively related to a firm's growth and positively related to its size.^ 
Firms in the earlier phases of the life cycle are generally smaller and faster 
growing than mature firms, and, by agency based arguments, are expected 
to use less financial leverage. To the extent that “young” firms also have rel­
atively more intense asymmetric information problems, they have difficulty 
raising external funds, and make relatively greater use of internal sources 
of capital. Kim and Sorenson [14], among others, document a negative 
relation between growth and leverage; many studies have reported the pos­
itive correlation between leverage and size.
Papaioannou, Strock, and Travlos [22] note that liquidity is affected by 
the competitiveness of the firm's product market. In a highly competitive 
environment, as exists in the early phases of the life cycle, the firm is unable 
to earn positive economic rents. To survive, the firm either lowers product 
price or reinvests cash flows into positive NPV projects and intangible 
investments, rather than accumulate liquidity. Informational asymmetries 
are greater in these firms, raising the cost and reducing the availability of 
debt financing for those needs. Smaller liquid reserves result from the 
higher cost of debt financing for high growth firms.
2. Investment decisions. Given the relatively richer set of investment 
options, one expects firms in the early phases of the life cycle to exhibit 
higher (proportional) tangible investment. Intangible investment, espe­
cially research and development activity, indicates future growth opportu­
nities. The availability of positive net present value projects precludes 
accumulating liquid assets.
Risk will be higher for firms in the early phases of the life cycle for two 
reasons. First, given the high degree of information asymmetry and the 
importance of growth options, young firms are likely to be perceived as 
being more risky by the market. Second, if founders are more entrepre­
neurial oriented as suggested by Holmes and Schmitz [10] and if this mind­
set involves a higher tolerance for risk, such firms should be riskier
3. Dividend decisions. The theoretical effects of life cycle on dividends 
are not clear. On the one hand, dividend payouts should be small for young
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firms. Their investment opportunities are a more valuable use of available 
funds than are dividends. Firms that rely on internal funds and reinvest 
earnings have less “free cash flow” to distribute as dividends. Simple obser­
vation shows growth stocks are traditionally low dividend stocks. On the 
other hand, growth options exacerbate informational asymmetry problems. 
Easterbrook [5] argues dividends reduce the resulting agency costs. More­
over, signalling models of the firm imply that dividend increases reveal 
management's expectations of higher future earnings. These asymmetric 
informational arguments suggest higher dividend payments for younger 
firms.®
C. Specific Variables
In this section we discuss the specific variables we use, and note the 
individual prediction generated by each effect.
1. Financing decisions. We measure the use of debt financing as the ratio 
of the book value of total assets to the book value of equity {LEVERAGE). 
The control retention hypothesis predicts that LEVERAGE will be higher in 
the founder sample; the life cycle hypothesis predicts it will be lower.
We measure liquidity with two variables, the current ratio (CA/CL) and 
the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets {CASHTA). As 
With LEVERAGE, the control retention hypothesis predicts higher values of 
the two liquidity measures in the founder managed sample; the life cycle 
hypothesis predicts lower values in the founder managed sample.
2. Investment decisions. We use two measures of tangible investment 
activity. Capital expenditure {CAPEXP) is the ratio of capital expenditures 
to total assets. The other measure of investment is based on the observation 
that the assets of rapidly growing firms are newer than those of firms invest­
ing more slowly. We measure average asset age {ASSETAGE) as the ratio of 
reported accumulated depreciation to depreciation expense. Since 
CAPEXP and the rate of growth of the firm (measured here by G(EMPLOY), 
the three year compound annual rate of growth in employees) are positively 
associated with investment,the life cycle hypothesis predicts these values 
will be higher in the founder managed sample, while control retention pre­
dicts lower values. Because a larger value of ASSETAGE reflects slower, 
older investment, the opposite predictions are made for this variable.
We measure two aspects of intangible investm ent, advertising 
{ADVERT) and research and development {R8cD). ADVERT is the ratio of 
advertising expense to sales, and R8cD is the ratio of research and develop­
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ment expense to sales. As was the case for tangible investment, the life cycle 
theory predicts higher values in the founder managed sample, while the 
control retention theory predicts lower values.
We measure firm specific risk {CONVAR) as the conditional variance 
calculated from estimating the single index market model with daily stock 
market returns. The control retention theory predicts founder managed 
firms will have lower risk while the life cycle theory predicts higher risk for 
them. We represent the market's perception of the risk-return tradeoff for 
the stock with the two coefficients estimated from the single index market 
model {ALPHA and BETA). As with CONVAR, the control retention theory 
associates lower values of ALPHA and BETA with founder managed firms, 
while the life cycle theory predicts higher values.
3. Dividend decisions. We use total dividend payout {PAYOUT) and 
common dividend yield {DIVYIELD) to measure dividend policy. The 
former is calculated as the three year average of the ratio of total dividends 
paid to income before extraordinary items, and the latter is calculated as 
the three year average of the ratio of common dividends paid to closing 
price at fiscal year end. The control retention theory predicts lower values 
of these variables for founder managed firms; the life cycle theory is ambig­
uous.
Table 1 provides a summary of the specific variables with the predicted 
effects of founder management under the two hypotheses.
IV SAMPLE AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The sample is drawn from the “200 Best Small Companies in America”, 
compiled in the November 14, 1988 issue of Forbes.'  ^ The Forbes data 
includes information about the chief executive of each firm, including age, 
tenure with the firm, tenure as CEO, salary, percentage held of the firm's 
stock, and whether the CEO is the founder. To obtain values for the finan­
cial attributes, we also require the firm to be included in the Compustat 
annual industrial files and in either the CRSP NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ 
daily returns files. All accounting variables are measured at the end of the 
1986 fiscal year The single index market model is estimated over the 200 
trading days ending December 31, 1986. A total of 75 firms satisfy these 
constraints.
Managerial control may stem from sources other than the CEO's 
founder status or stockholdings. For each of the firms, we also examined 
Standard and Poor's Stock Reports to identify the percentage of stock held by 
officers and directors, family trusts, and other “allies.” Moody's industrial
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Table 1
Predicted Sign under the Two Hypotheses 
of the Relation of Each Decision 
Variable to Founder Management
Variable"^ Control Retention Life Cycle
LEVERAGE + -
CA/CL + -
CASHTA 4- -
CAPEXP - +
G(EMPLOY) - +
ASSETAGE + -
ADVERT - +
R&D - +
CONVAR - +
ALPHA - +
BETA - +
PAYOUT - p
DIVYIELD - ?
Notes: Definition and calculation of variables:
Tangible investment:
CAPEXP = Capital Expenditures /  Total Assets. 
ASSETAGE = Accumulated Depreciation / Depreciation 
Expense.
G(EMPLOY) = Three Year Compound Annual Rate Of 
Growth In Employees.
Intangible investment:
ADVERT = Advertising Expense / Sales.
R&D = Research and Development Expense/Sales.
Market perception o f risk:
ALPHA
BETA
CONVAR =
Leverage:
LEVERAGE =
Liquidity;
CA/CL
CASHTA =
Dividend policy: 
PAYOUT =
DIVYIELD =
Intercept Term Estimated Erom The Single 
Index Market Model.
Market Coefficient Estimated From The 
Single Index Market Model.
Conditional \kriance In Daily Returns 
From The Single Index Market Model.
Book Value Of Total Assets / Book Value Of 
Common Equity.
Current Assets / Current Liabilities.
Cash And Short Term Investments / Total 
Assets.
Three Year Average Of Total Dividends 
P^id/Income Before Extraordinary Items. 
Three Year Average o f Common Dividends 
Paid / Closing Price At Fiscal Year End.
manuals also were examined to identify which of the firms had dual classes 
of stock or had “poison pill” provisions.
The 75 firm sample contains 30 firms in which the chief executive is 
also the founder. Thirty-one two-digit SIC codes are represented in the 
sample. Although there does not appear to be any industry clustering in 
the overall sample, founder managed firms exhibit some clustering (10 of 
the 30 firms) into the non-financial service industries (primary SIC codes 
over 7000), compared to only four of the 45 nonfounder managed firms. 
To control for possible industry effects in the analyses, we create a service 
industry binary variable (one if the SIC code is 7000 or greater, zero other­
wise).^
Table 2 presents the means for the variables of interest described 
above, and for other general attributes of the sample, broken down by 
founder status. The right-most two columns of the table displays the ^-sta- 
tistic and the associated “p-value” (the significance probability of t) for each 
variable for the test of differences between the means of the two groups. 
The growth rate, G(EMPLOY), is measured as the three year compound 
annual rate of growth in employees.
Examination of the data reveal that the two samples differ in several 
respects. Looking first at the decision variables, we find that the sign for 
the differences in ASSETAGE is as predicted by the life cycle hypothesis, 
while those for ADVERT, PAYOUT and DIVYIELD behave as predicted by 
the control retention hypothesis. Differences between the two samples for 
the other variables are statistically not different from zero at the 0.10 level.
A comparison of the remaining variables indicates that the samples 
differ in other dimensions as well. The data reveal founders to be older, 
and to hold a greater percentage of the firm's stock than nonfounders. 
Although founders have been CEOs longer than nonfounders, neither 
their total tenure with the firm nor their salary (which includes any bonus) 
is significantly different from that of nonfounders. Five of the firms headed 
by nonfounders have dual voting classes of stock, and two have poison pill 
provisions; founder managed firms are less likely to use these “entrench­
ment” methods. Both groups have sizable percentages of the common 
stock in the hands of allies: officers, directors, family trusts, and employee 
trusts. In seven of the founder managed firms, compared to five of the non­
founder managed firms, more than 50% of the common shares is controlled 
by allies.
Founder managed firms are seen to be younger than nonfounder 
managed firms in that they are smaller, with (slightly) higher growth rates 
in sales and employees, and newer fixed assets, on average. For the three 
estimates from the single index market model {ALPHA, BETA, or CONVAR),
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Table 2
Means of Various Characteristics of the Samples by Founder Status 
of Chief Executive Officer with Test Statistics for Differences in 
Means between the Two Samples
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Attribute
Founder as CEO Nonfounder as 
(N = 30) CEO (N = 45) t-statistic p  value for t
A. Decision Variables
LEVERAGE 1.642 1.648 0.051 0.960
CA/CL 4.378 3.200 1.829 0.075
CASHTA 0.249 0.204 1.030 0.307
CAPEXP 0.103 0.095 0.331 0.742
G(EMPLOY) 16.280 10.700 1.661 0.101
ASSETAGE 4.048 5.240 -2 .156 0.034
ADVERT 0.009 0.024 -2 .286 0.026
R&D 0.017 0.024 -0 .906 0.378
PAYOUT 0.065 0.220 -4.612 0.000
DIVYIELD 0.005 0.014 -4.157 0.000
B. Market Model Coefficients
CONVAR(xlOO) 0.108 0.048 1.670 0.105
ALPHA 0.001 0.001 -1.324 0.192
BETA 1.226 1.029 1.040 0.302
C. Other Firm Characteristics
Sales ($MM) 74.000 125.156 -3 .040 0.003
Assets ($MM) 69.533 102.578 -1.602 0.114
Shareholders (M) 1.648 1.871 -0 .624 0.534
Sales Growth (%) 26.870 21.303 1.495 0.139
D. Chief Executive Officer Characteristics
CEO's Age 58.9 53.6 2.806 0.006
Years with Company 22.7 19.9 1.106 0.272
Years as CEO 19.7 10.6 4.398 0.000
Salary ($M) 304.2 341.5 -0 .859 0.393
Ownership (%) 17.85 8.31 2.795 0.007
E. Other Control Entrenchment Characteristics
Dual Classes 2 5
Poison Pills 0 2
Allies* % Owned 29.03 22.24 1.399 0.166
No. > 50% Owned 7 5
Note: * Management, insiders, and allies of management.
none of the differences between the two sample groups is statistically signif­
icant at the 0.10 level.
Because we want to isolate the effect of founder status as cleanly as pos­
sible, we report the results of cross-sectional regressions of the various deci­
sion variables on founder status (FOUNDER) and a collection of control
variables. Since we are interested in the effect of founder status on control 
retaining behavior, we include another measure of the degree of managerial 
control (STOCK). We also must control for measurable dimensions of the 
firm's life cycle. For this, we include two proxy measures for phase of the 
life cycle, G(EMPLOY) and SIZE. Specifically, the regression analysis takes 
the form;
Y = Bq + Bi*FOUNDER + B2* STOCK + B^*G(EMPLOY) + B^*SIZE
Here, Y represents any of the nine decision variables or three market 
model measures. The right-hand variables control for the effects of 
founder status, manager ownership, and stage of the firm in the life cycle.® 
We do not assume any structure other than that of the two hypotheses. We 
consider neither a system of simultaneous equations, nor any interaction 
terms. Our estimated models are the reduced forms of any such a system 
across the policy variables.
The regressor variable of most interest is FOUNDER, a binary (0,1) 
variable, which takes the value one if the CEO is the founder. The predic­
tions of the previous section concern the sign on the coefficient of this vari­
able resulting from control retention or life cycle considerations, as 
depicted in Table 1.
The extent of the CEO‘s ownership of the firm potentially reveals the 
CEO's desire to retain control. The greater the value placed on retaining 
control, the greater will be the CEO's stake in the firm. Manager ownership 
interest in the firm is measured by STOCK, the percentage of the firm's com­
mon owned by the CEO. Table 2 shows that founders own significantly 
more of their firm's common stock than do nonfounders in the sample. The 
variable STOCK is included to separate differences in control preference 
related to founder status from those associated with ownership structure.^®
Life cycle effects are reflected in two variables, G(EMPLOY) and SIZE. 
G(EMPLOY) is a proxy for the growth aspects of life cycle, and equals the 
three year compound annual rate of growth in employees. The natural log­
arithm of annual sales is included as an independent variable, SIZE, to con­
trol for effects of differences in size. Table 2 indicates that the founder 
managed firms are significantly smaller than nonfounder managed firms in 
the sample, and have a numerically greater growth rate. The coefficients 
of both variables are evaluated in light of the predictions of the life cycle 
hypothesis.
The correlation coefficients for the four regressor variables are in 
Table 3. FOUNDER is significantly negatively correlated with SIZE, signif­
icantly positively correlated with STOCK, and weakly positively correlated
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Table 3
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Four Independent 
Regressors with Significance Probabilities in Parentheses
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STOCK G(EMPLOY) SIZE
FOUNDER 0.330 0.191 -0.373
(0.004) (0.101) (0.001)
STOCK 0.016 0.058
(0.893) (0.618)
G(EMPLOY) -0.093
(0.426)
Notes: Definition and calculation of variables:
FOUNDER = 1 if the CEO is also a founder of the firm;
0 otherwise.
STOCK = the percentage of shares outstanding owned 
by the CEO.
G(EMPLOY) = the 3-year compound annual growth rate in 
employees.
SIZE = logarithm (In) of sales.
with G(EMPLOY), all consistent with founder management being associated 
with earlier stages of the firm's life cycle. All other correlation coefficients 
are not significant.
The final issue we consider is whether founders utilize their privileged 
position to extract greater direct compensation from the firm. The benefits 
to retaining control can be tangible, reflected in higher than average salary. 
We use the same estimating equation to examine the CEO's salary as a func­
tion FOUNDER, STOCK, G(EMPLOY) and SIZE.
V. RESULTS
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 4. For each regression, the 
overall F statistic, its significance probability, and the adjusted for the 
regression are included, in addition to the estimates of the coefficients and 
the associated significance probabilities for the four regressors. The esti­
mated regression coefficients are stable to addition or deletion among the 
regressors. As was the case in the simple comparison of the two samples, 
both control retention and life cycle effects are seen at work.
The regression for LEVERAGE is not very informative about the 
hypotheses, in that the overall regression is not significant. The estimated 
coefficient of SIZE is positive, a reasonable result since larger firms are 
expected to have relatively higher debt levels. The relation between insider
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Table 4
Regression Results for Effects on Firm Attributes of Founder Status, Fraction 
of Shares Owned by the CEO, Employee Growth Rate, and Size.^ 
Model: K = Sq + B^*FOUNDER + B2*ST0CK + B^*G(EMPLOY) + B^*SIZE
Dependent
Variable Br Bn B, B,
LEVERAGE -0.659 0.034 0.513 0.010 0.123 1.740 0.038
(0.562) (0.794) (0.208) (0.980) (0.050) (0.151)
CA'CL 23.792 0.356 -1.404 2.567 -1.127 6.116 0.217
(0.000) (0.564) (0.472) (0.160) (0.000) (0.000)
CASHTA 1.209 -0.025 0.137 0.273 -0.057 2.673 0.083
(0.007) (0.616) (0.380) (0.063) (0.019) (0.039)
CAPEXP -0.390 0.007 0.188 0.013 0.025 3.797 0.131
(0.059) (0.754) (0.012) (0.844) (0.025) (0.008)
ASSETAGE 12.790 -1.412 3.199 -6.522 -0.387 4.727 0.168
(0.034) (0.038) (0.135) (0.002) (0.234) (0.002)
ADVERT 0.005 -0.018 0.033 0.011 0.001 1.312 0.017
(0.948) (0.054) (0.260) (0.692) (0.854) (0.274)
R&D 0.046 -0.007 -0.041 0.053 -0.001 2.125 0.057
(0.540) (0.431) (0.132) (0.038) (0.743) (0.087)
CONVAR" 1.146 0.026 -0.017 -0.106 -0.059 5.201 0.185
(0.000) (0.431) (0.870) (0.274) (0.000) (0.001)
ALPHA‘S 0.536 -0.068 0.084 0.062 -0.023 1.161 0.009
(0.076) (0.046) (0.431) (0.534) (0.162) (0.336)
BETA -3.916 0.288 -0.328 2.245 0.257 5.692 0.202
(0.030) (0.154) (0.605) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
PAYOUT -0.406 -0.090 -0.242 -0.283 0.037 7.066 0.247
(0.289) (0.041) (0.079) (0.028) (0.081) (0.000)
DIVYLD'' -3.265 -0.518 -1.130 -2.458 0.274 7.589 0.263
(0.191) (0.068) (0.206) (0.004) (0.046) (0.000)
Notes: ® Numbers in parentheses are significance probabilities 
(fo r j =  0,...,4), and that F =  0.
'’ BsisxlO^
All coefficients are xlO^, except is xlO^
for the tests that Bj = 0
ownership and leverage is not significant, a result contrary to that of Jensen, 
Solberg, and Zorn [12].
Similarly, in the regressions involving CA/CL and CASHTA only the 
coefficient of SIZE is significant. Liquidity is an inverse function of firm
size, inconsistent with the Ufe cycle concept, but not evidence of control 
retention behavior. The significant coefficient for G(EMPLOY) in the 
CASHTA regression is an industry effect, this coefficient becoming not sin- 
ificantly different from zero when the service industry variable is included. 
The somewhat greater liquidity of the founder manager sample indicated 
in Table 2 is apparently unrelated to founder status.
The variables measuring tangible investment generally respond to life 
cycle effects. In the regression involving capital expenditure, while the 
coefficient of FOUNDER is not significant, those for STOCK and SIZE are 
positive and significant. By construction, STOCK captures effects of the 
direct voting control of the manager Thus its estimated coefficient is con­
sistent with a Leland and Pyle signalling with insider ownership. The pos­
itive relation between SIZE and CAPEXP is inconsistent, however, with the 
presumption of the life cycle hypothesis that growth options decline with 
size.^^
In the regression onASSETAGE, the coefficient oiFOUNDER is signif­
icant and in the direction predicted by the life cycle hypothesis. Also con­
sistent with the life cycle hypothesis, the coefficient of G(EMPLOY) is 
negative and significant, indicating lower growth being associated with 
older assets.
The results for the measures of intangible investment are inconclusive. 
In the regression for ADVERT, the regressors explain little of the variability 
in advertising expense. Nonetheless, the FOUNDER coefficient is signifi­
cant and negative, indicating founder managed firms undertake relatively 
less of this form of intangible investment, weakly consistent with control 
retention behavior In the regression for R&D, neither the coefficient of 
FOUNDER nor of STOCK is significant.^^ The significant positive coeffi­
cient of G(EMPLOY) is consistent with higher growth being associated with 
greater expenditures for research and development.
The estimates of the risk-return tradeoff from the market model are 
inconclusive. The ALPHA regression is not significant, although the coeffi­
cient for FOUNDER indicates the market penalizes founder managed 
firms, consistent with control retention. The coefficients on SIZE for the 
two risk measures are both significant, but with opposite signs.
The dividend policy variables most clearly reflect control retention 
behavior Even after controlling for life cycle effects, the estimated coeffi­
cients of FOUNDER for both measures are significantly negative. Founder 
managed firms pay smaller dividends and have smaller dividend yields 
than other firms.
The regression estimates for the analysis of the CEO‘s salary are dis­
played in Table 5. After controlling for the firm's size and growth, and for
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Table 5
Regression Results for Effects on Salary of Founder Status, Fraction of 
Shares Owned by the CEO, Employee Growth Rate, and Size.^
Model: Salary = Bq + Bi*FOUNDER + B^^ STOCK + B *^G(EMPLOY) + B *^SIZE
Control Preference and Financial AUributes 59
Bo ^4 F ,2
-1014.85 -11.05 239.13 0.559 72.28 4.037 0.141
(0.018) (0.817) (0.116) (0.691) (0.002) (0.005)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are significance probabilities for the tests that -Sj = 0 
(fb r j =  0,...,4), and that F =  0.
Bsis Xloa­
the CEO's stockholdings, we find no significant relation between founder 
status and SALARY. Therefore, with respect to direct compensation, there is 
no evidence of self-dealing behavior by the founders in this sample.
In summary, even controlling for insider ownership, the firm's rate of 
growth, and its size, we find some financial decisions are influenced by 
founder status. In the area of tangible investments, the life cycle effects 
seem dominant. Weak evidence of control retention is more found in the 
results for intangible investment activity. The greatest evidence of control 
retention is with dividends. Liquidity and firm-specific risk do not appear 
to be affected by either hypothesis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The findings of Morck, Shleifner, and Vishny [18, 19, 20], Johnson et al. 
[13], and others suggests founder status of the CEO adversely affects the 
value of the firm. We examine the effects of founder status on the financing, 
investment, and dividend policies of the firm to determine if founders' 
tighter control of their firms leads to different decision making behavior, or 
if the firms' stage in the life cycle dominates the decisions.
A comparison of samples of founder managed and nonfounder man­
aged firms reveals differences in the financial behavior of the two sets of 
firms. These differences persist even after controlling for variables 
designed to measure the firm's stage in the “life cycle” and other factors. 
In some dimensions (notably tangible investment) the differences appear to 
reflect life cycle effects. To the extent that this occurs, founder status is still 
serving as a proxy for life cycle status. That is, the control variables do not 
completely capture the life cycle effects.
In other cases (dividends and advertising) the observed differences are 
consistent with the control retention hypothesis and not the life cycle 
hypothesis. We interpret this as evidence that, in at least some areas, there
are differences in managerial behavior more easily attributed to the man­
ager's status as a founder than to exogenous economic circumstances. This 
evidence confirms suggestions in previous literature that such differences 
might exist. Moreover, our findings have consequences for theories of 
entrepreneurship, such as those proposed by Holmes and Schmitz, as well 
as for the financial analysis and management of founder run firms.
NOTES
1. This relation does not necessarily imply an inefficiency in founders' management. 
Shleifer and Vishny [26] propose there can exist manager-specific implicit contracts 
between the executive and employees, suppliers, customers, etc., the value o f which is 
captured in the executive's compensation (defined to include entrenchment). If the 
executive dies in office, the firm gains the contracts, and thus their value; if the 
executive is fired, he/she retains the contracts. There is evidence, however, that the 
relation observed by Johnson et al. is not a founder effect, but is a result o f the founder's 
usually large ownership stake. Slovin and Shuska [27] find the market's response to the 
death of an inside blockholder to be a function of the size of the block and independent 
of the deceased's founder status.
2. Their concern is with insider ownership. While finding no relation between liquidity 
and managerial ownership, they report liquidity is positively related to a Tobin's q ratio 
(their proxy for positive rents) and intangible investment (specialized resources and 
information), and negatively related to leverage and the length o f the cash cycle 
(operating constraints).
3. Consistent with our prediction, Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn [12] extend their monitoring 
argument to firm specific risk and the financing decision. Decreasing the firm's 
business risk decreases the costs o f monitoring management, and increases the 
availability of debt financing.
4. Under special circumstances, however, a founder's need to retain numerical control of 
voting rights can lead to an increase in dividend payouts. The Wall Street Journal 
(February 3, 1992, p. B7) reports that Turner Broadcasting System would pay its first 
dividend since 1975, most likely to provide funds for its founder's personal projects. 
The founder, Ted Turner, had been selling his stock for this purpose, but in the process 
had reduced his holdings to 56% of the voting control.
5. This literature is reviewed in Harris and Raviv [8].
6. Historical evidence can overshadow theoretical ambiguities. Pilotte [24], for recent 
example, uses dividend policy as an inverse proxy for growth opportunities, rejecting 
alternative interpretations o f dividends as a proxy for informational asymmetry or 
liquidity.
7. These 200 firms are clearly not a random set, and drawing the sample from the “best” 
companies may create a selection bias. This sample, however, is appropriate for the 
structure of the analysis. The regressions assume that the CEO's desire to retain control 
affects his or her investment and financing decisions, and thus affects the financial 
characteristics of the firm. This structure is reasonable given the focus on founder 
status as the proxy for preference for control. An alternative argument (related to that 
of Leland and Pyle [16]), is that the firm's characteristics influence the CEO's desire to 
retain control and ownership status. It is easier to want to retain control of a successful
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firm than an unsuccessful one. By sampling from a group of “best” firms, firms that are 
all successful, the likelihood of this alternative structural relationship is reduced.
8. We would have pieferred a matching procedure to control for industry effects, but that 
is not feasible here. Founder CEOs are not distributed proportionately across 
industries, at least not in the Forbes data. A test of independence between one-digit SIC 
codes and founder status (one if founder, zero otherwise) has a chi-square of 13.427, 
with eight degrees of freedom, significant at the 0.10 level. When service industry 
classification is also reduced to a binary variable (1 if the SIC code is 7000 or greater, 
zero otherw i^se), the chi-square is 7.084, significant at the 0.01 level.
9. To determine the sensitivity of our results to industry effects, we repeat the analyses 
including the service industiy binary variable as an independent variable. Except as 
noted, the results are unaffected by the inclusion of this variable.
10. All analyses are repeated redefining STOCK to include the percentage of the firm's 
common owned by allies, including the CEO, in order to minimize the effects of limits 
to founder wealth, and to more closely measure the shares controlled by the manager. 
The results are unaffected by this variation, and are not reported. Table 2 indicates that 
while the ownership by allies is greater for the founder managed firms, the mean is not 
significantly different from that for the nonfounder managed firms in the sample.
11. One possible explanation recognizes that all these firms are small firms. Within small 
firms, a relatively larger firm may have an advantage in exploiting tangible growth 
opportunities.
12. When the stockholdings of allies are used instead of STOCK, the estimated coefficient 
on this variable becomes positive and significant, consistent with the control retention 
hypothesis. The coefficient of FOUNDER remains negative.
13. When the stockholdings of allies replace STOCK, the estimated coefficient on R&fD is 
negative and significant, consistent with control retention.
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